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1 Introduction
It is a well documented fact in most developed economies that immigrants perform sig-
nificantly worse in the labor market than their native counterparts (see, e.g., Dustmann
and Frattini, 2013). In many cases, the main reason appears to be a lack of human cap-
ital, which pushes immigrants into low paying and precarious jobs and prohibits them
from moving into more desirable segments of the labor market. However, even when
immigrants accumulated valuable skills in their countries of origin prior to migration, the
transferability of these skills to the host country economy is often problematic, partly
because of insufficient language skills (Chiswick and Miller, 2003), partly because of
the limited signaling function of foreign qualifications which makes it difficult for native
employers to assess immigrants’ occupational skills.1 In addition, legal restrictions of-
ten prohibit immigrants from working in certain occupations (Sweetman et al., 2015).
Kleiner (2017), for instance, reports that the share of the US workforce holding an occu-
pational license increased from less than 5 percent in the 1950s to about 25 percent in
2015. Koumenta and Pagliero (2016) document a similarly important role of occupational
regulation in the EU, where the share of the workforce with a license reached 22 percent
in 2015, with Denmark ranking lowest (14 percent) and Germany ranking highest (33
percent).
While occupational regulation is meant to ensure a minimum quality standard within
a profession (e.g. Leland, 1979, Bryson and Kleiner, 2010), its prevalence is likely to have
a particularly detrimental effect on the labor market outcomes of immigrants. Without
formal recognition of their foreign qualifications, immigrants would often not be able to
work in licensed occupations nor would they be able to credibly signal their occupational
skills to native employers, who are all too often unfamiliar with the skill content of foreign
qualifications. This may lead to an underutilization of immigrants’ skills as suggested by
the widespread occupational downgrading immigrants experience in many labor markets
after arrival (see, for example, Friedberg, 2001, for Israel, Mattoo et al., 2008, for the
US, and Dustmann et al., 2013, for the UK). Facilitating the recognition of foreign qual-
ifications might be a way to overcome this inefficiency and fundamentally improve the
economic integration of immigrants in their host countries.
In this paper, we estimate the impact of occupational recognition on immigrants’ la-
bor market outcomes. To obtain recognition for their foreign credentials, immigrants in
Germany are required to go through a formal process, at the end of which, if success-
ful, the responsible authorities certify the equivalence between the immigrants’ foreign
qualification and its German counterpart. From a labor market perspective, occupa-
tional recognition affects labor market outcomes through two main mechanisms. First, a
1One manifestation of the low transferability of human capital are the remarkably low returns to
foreign education and experience observed in many destination countries (see Dustmann and Glitz,
2011, for a comprehensive overview of this literature).
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successful recognition gives the immigrants access to segments of the labor market that
they could previously not enter. These regulated segments tend to be characterized by
high wages, both because of high returns to skills and because of monopoly rents from
occupational licensing (see e.g. Stigler, 1971, Kleiner and Krueger, 2010, 2013, or Gittle-
man et al., 2018).2 Second, occupational recognition reduces uncertainty about the skills
of immigrant workers, which allows employers both in the regulated and unregulated
segment of the labor market to better screen in the hiring process, leading to higher qual-
ity matches between workers and firms (Arrow, 1973, Spence, 1973). Both mechanisms
thus suggest a positive impact of occupational recognition on immigrants’ employment
outcomes and wages.
Identifying the causal impact of occupational recognition is not straightforward due
to self-selection on the part of the immigrants. Presumably, those immigrants who obtain
occupational recognition would also perform comparatively well in the labor market if
they had not received it, even conditional on other observable characteristics. This is
because having obtained recognition reflects a specific set of skills that is likely to be
generally valued in the labor market, both in the regulated and unregulated segment.
In addition, immigrants who decide to go through the costly application process are
likely to differ from those who do not in terms of unobservable characteristics such as
ambition and motivation, factors that on their own would be associated with better
labor market outcomes. We deal with these issues by exploiting a novel German data
set that links detailed survey information on the exact timing of the application process
for recognition with comprehensive social security data on the respondents’ entire work
histories in Germany. Taking advantage of the longitudinal dimension of our data, we
estimate both static and dynamic difference-in-differences specifications, comparing the
labor market outcomes of immigrants who obtain full recognition to those of immigrants
who either never apply or have not yet received full recognition themselves. While the
estimates from the static models allow us to assess the average effects of occupational
recognition on labor market outcomes in our sample, the estimates from the dynamic
specifications provide information on the precise evolution of the employment and wage
effects over time.
Our empirical findings show substantial positive effects of occupational recognition
on employment and wages. On average, immigrants in our sample who obtained full
2For evidence on the positive association between occupational licensing and wages in specific profes-
sions in the US, see Pagliero (2011) for lawyers, Timmons and Thornton (2008) for radiologic technolo-
gists, Timmons and Thornton (2010) for barbers, Thornton and Timmons (2013) for massage therapists,
and Angrist and Guryan (2008) for teachers’ certification. The positive wage effects, however, do not
necessarily lead to a higher quality of the offered services as shown, for example, by Angrist and Guryan
(2008) who find increases of 3-5 percent in the wages of teachers with state-mandated teacher testing in
the US but no increase in the quality of teaching. Kleiner and Kudrle (2000) and Kleiner et al. (2014)
come to similar conclusions for the dentistry and medical doctor professions, respectively, where more
stringent licensing requirements lead to higher prices but no improvement in quality.
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recognition in the past are 16.5 percentage points more likely to be employed and earn
15.1 percent higher wages than comparable immigrants who have either not applied or
not yet received recognition themselves. We show that these employment effects are pri-
marily driven by successful immigrants moving into occupations that were previously not
accessible because of licensing restrictions. These movements into regulated occupations
occur both out of non-employment and by workers moving from unregulated to regulated
occupations.
Turning to the dynamic processes underlying these average effects, our estimates show
that the probability of being employed relative to the control group increases rapidly with
the receipt of occupational recognition, reaching 17.1 percentage points within the first
twelve months. In subsequent years, the employment gap continues to widen, though at
a lower pace, reaching a value of 24.5 percentage points three years after recognition. The
wage gains from occupational recognition take a little longer to materialize but increase
steadily after obtaining recognition, reaching 19.8 percent after three years. There is
no evidence of any significant anticipation effects, neither in the employment nor in
the wage regressions. The relative shift into the regulated segment of the labor market
starts directly after recognition, primarily through movements out of non-employment.
Movements from unregulated to regulated occupations, in contrast, only start intensifying
with some delay.
Studying the heterogeneity of these effects across different subgroups of immigrants,
our findings suggest that occupational recognition is beneficial for all groups considered.
The effects on employment, wages, and access to regulated occupations are positive for all
education levels and particularly large for individuals holding a foreign doctoral degree.
When looking at the type of occupation for which individuals apply for recognition, our
estimates are largest for the group of physicians, dentists, veterinarians and pharmacists
for whom recognition is mandatory to practice their profession. However, occupational
recognition improves the employment and wage outcomes also for those groups of workers
who do not have mandatory recognition requirements, indicating that the certification
of the quality of training received in the home country has an independent value in the
German labor market.
While our administrative data do not allow us to analyze directly the quality of im-
migrants’ work in regulated occupations vis-a-vis that of their native counterparts, we
estimate standard earnings assimilation profiles in which we allow the speed of conver-
gence to change with the recognition of immigrants’ foreign qualifications. We show that
earnings growth relative to natives accelerates after obtaining recognition, and that the
earnings of immigrants who receive full recognition eventually fully converge to those of
comparable natives, which could be interpreted as evidence for a similar quality in the
services provided by immigrants and natives.
Our paper relates to the literature on the economic assimilation of immigrants (see,
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e.g., Borjas, 1995, or Lubotsky, 2007) in that it studies a specific mechanism through
which immigrants may be held back in the host country’s labor market. In comparison
to this extensive literature, the evidence regarding the impact of occupational recognition
on immigrant labor market outcomes is scarce.3 Kugler and Sauer (2005) address this
research question by exploiting the fact that Soviet trained physicians who immigrated
to Israel in the early 1990s were exogenously assigned to different re-training tracks that
differentially affected the probability of eventually obtaining a medical license. Their in-
strumental variable estimates show substantial monetary returns from obtaining a medical
license of the order of 200 percent of monthly earnings within 3 to 4 years after arrival
in Israel. Gomez et al. (2015) study the effect of occupational licensing on immigrant
labor market outcomes in Canada, using annual data from the Survey of Labour and
Income Dynamics (SLID). Controlling for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity, their
estimates show that immigrants receive a 20 log points earnings premium for working
in a licensed occupation but are also 20 percent less likely to work in such an occupa-
tion than natives with similar observable characteristics. In similar regressions based
on the Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to Australia (LSIA), Tani (2018) finds that
immigrants working in licensed occupations earn around 15 log points higher wages than
comparable immigrants working in unlicensed occupations. Focussing more specifically
on the role of occupational recognition on labor market outcomes, Chapman and Iredale
(1993) find that immigrant men who unsuccessfully apply for recognition in Australia
earn 15 to 30 percent lower wages than their successful counterparts, while Tani (2015)
provides some evidence that the official assessment of immigrants’ foreign educational
degrees after arrival in Australia is associated with significantly higher wage rates.
While the qualitative results of these studies are similar to some of ours, there are
a number of important differences. First, rather than approaching the question of how
occupational recognition affects immigrant labor market outcomes indirectly by studying
the effects of working in a licensed occupation on wages, we analyze this question directly
by focussing on the actual occupational recognition process. Since access to licensed
occupations is only one channel through which occupational recognition can improve
immigrants’ labor market outcomes, our analysis thus provides a more comprehensive
assessment of this important labor market institution. Second, apart from wages, we
also consider employment and occupational mobility as distinct outcomes in our empir-
ical analysis. Third, we analyze the effects of occupational recognition for a broader set
of qualifications, including both post-secondary education and vocational training. Fi-
nally, we exploit unique information about the precise timing of the recognition process
to estimate dynamic effects at monthly frequency, allowing us to identify both short-
and long-run effects and to argue more convincingly for a causal relationship between
3For an overview of the literature on occupational regulation and its interplay with the recognition
of foreign qualifications, see Sweetman et al. (2015).
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occupational recognition and immigrants’ labor market outcomes.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section describes the institutional setting
in which the occupational recognition process takes place in Germany. Section 3 presents
the empirical model and identification strategy. Section 4 describes our data set and
provides some key summary statistics. Section 5 presents the main results together with
a number of robustness checks and further supportive analysis. Section 6 links our findings
to the earnings assimilation process of immigrants in Germany. Section 7 concludes the
paper.
2 Institutional Setting
For an immigrant about to enter the German labor market, the distinction between reg-
ulated and unregulated occupations is of central importance. As many other European
countries, Germany has a long tradition of regulated occupations dating back to medieval
times. The entry and practice of regulated occupations is thereby governed by legal or
administrative provisions that require proof of specific professional qualifications. Only
individuals who have the required qualifications or, in the case of immigrants, obtained
formal recognition of their foreign qualifications, are entitled to work in regulated occupa-
tions and use the corresponding professional job titles.4 As of 2018, the regulated segment
of the German labor market comprises 419 occupations (Bundesagentur für Arbeit, 2018),
of which 29 percent are professions in the health sector (e.g. physicians, psychotherapists,
pharmacists, nurses, physiotherapists), 27 percent professions in the technical sector (e.g.
architects, engineers, physicists), 17 percent professions in the public sector (e.g. civil
servants, policemen, firemen), 12 percent professions in the educational sector (e.g. teach-
ers, educators, social workers), 7 percent professions in the transport sector (e.g. pilots),
and 2 percent legal professions (e.g. lawyers, judges, attorneys).5
The authorities in charge of the recognition process for regulated occupations in Ger-
many are very heterogeneous, depending on the particular occupation pursued. In the
important health sector, the recognition of the degrees of physicians, dentists, pharma-
cists and nurses is regulated by governmental health authorities at the state (Länder)
level, in case of specialists (Fachärzte) additionally by the respective chambers. The
entry to most occupations in the education sector, in turn, is regulated by educational
4In practice, occupational regulation can take many different forms with the literature mainly distin-
guishing between registration, certification and licensure. While there are no uniform definitions of these
types of regulation, only licensure is generally viewed as being exclusionary in that it restricts access
to certain occupations (see e.g. Kleiner and Krueger, 2013 or Sweetman et al., 2015). In distinguish-
ing between regulated and unregulated occupations, we follow the German terminology which uses the
terms regulated occupation and licensed occupation synonymously. For more details about the recognition
process and the legal background in Germany, see https://www.anerkennung-in-deutschland.de.
5About three-quarters of the regulated occupations in Germany require an academic degree, some-
times in conjunction with further training. The remaining quarter of occupations require vocational
training degrees or an occupational training in the public sector.
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authorities at the state level, and the entry to most regulated technical occupations by
either governmental authorities or chambers, also at the state level. In contrast, in some
selected occupations, for instance in the transport sector, the responsible authorities op-
erate at the national level while for some occupations relevant for local authorities, the
municipalities themselves are in charge of the recognition process.
In contrast to regulated occupations, formal recognition is not a precondition for the
practice of unregulated occupations. Immigrants may work in these occupations without
a license and thus without obtaining recognition for their foreign qualifications. For most
unregulated occupations, however, immigrants can voluntarily apply for an assessment
of their foreign qualifications. In case of a successful evaluation, the notice received at
the end of this process serves as an official and legally secure document confirming the
equivalence of the foreign qualification with the relevant German reference qualification.
Examples of unregulated occupations where this type of certification is possible are so-
called training occupations (e.g. office management clerks, mechanics or electricians) and
advanced training occupations (e.g. master craftsman qualifications, certified advisors,
certified senior clerks, specialist commercial clerks or business economists).6 The most
important authorities for the certification process of unregulated occupations are the
chambers of industry and commerce (Industrie- und Handelskammern) and the chambers
of crafts (Handwerkskammern). While the chambers of industry and commerce have set
up a central authority at the national level responsible for the recognition of foreign
qualifications, the chambers of crafts are organized at the state level.
In order to apply for recognition, immigrants are not required to hold German citi-
zenship or be in the possession of a residence permit for Germany. There is also no need
to be living in Germany at the time of application, allowing immigrants to initiate the
process while still being located abroad. Applications for occupational recognition need
to be accompanied by extensive documentation: proof of identity, tabular summary of
the training courses completed including previous occupational activity if relevant, proof
of vocational qualification, proof of relevant occupational experience, evidence of other
qualifications (e.g. continuing vocational training courses), a declaration of having not
previously submitted an application, and evidence of the intention to work in Germany
(which does not apply to nationals of the EU/EEA/Switzerland and persons residing
in the EU/EEA/Switzerland). All documents must be submitted in German, with the
relevant translations made by publicly authorized or certified interpreters or translators.
Applications are subject to an administrative fee ranging between 100 and 600 euros de-
pending on the occupation and the federal state in which the application is submitted.
The costs of fees and other expenses, for instance for translations and certifications of
6All training occupations, i.e. occupations for which training takes place within the dual system, are
unregulated in Germany. In contrast, recognition is compulsory in order to work as a self-employed in
some craft trades that require a license.
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documents, must be borne by the applicants themselves.7 Since 2005, a proof of lan-
guage proficiency can be made an additional requirement for the recognition of foreign
credentials, as for example in the case of physicians.
These administrative features of the application process suggest that the bureaucratic
hurdles to obtain occupational recognition in Germany are not negligible. According to
our survey data, among those immigrants who hold a foreign certificate and could there-
fore, in principle, apply for occupational recognition, only 35.8 percent end up doing so.
The main reasons put forward for not applying are that a recognition is not considered
important by the respondent (38.1 percent), that an application would have no chance
of succeeding (12.9 percent), that the respondent does not know how to apply (6.6 per-
cent), that the procedure is too bureaucratic or time-consuming (6.6 percent) and that
important documentation is missing (4.6 percent). Monetary costs, in contrast, seem to
constitute only a minor obstacle to applying (2.8 percent).
At the end of the recognition process, there are three possible outcomes: denial, partial
recognition and full recognition.8 In the case of partial recognition, which is a possible
outcome only in the context of unregulated occupations, the assessment notification issued
by the responsible authorities includes a detailed description of the existing qualifications
as well as the knowledge that is still missing relative to the German reference qualification.
The notification also provides concrete suggestions for training or apprenticeship measures
which, if completed successfully, can then lead to a new application. A decision of full
recognition, in turn, certifies the equivalence of the foreign qualification with the relevant
German reference qualification and gives the worker full access to the relevant occupation
and job title.
During most of our sample period, the recognition of European professional and vo-
cational qualifications was regulated at the European level.9 In contrast, for immigrants
from third countries outside the EU, the EAA and Switzerland, there was no common
official procedure regulating the recognition of foreign qualifications. In the absence of
a legal basis, decisions on the equivalence between foreign and German qualifications for
this group of immigrants were more idiosyncratic, with the applicant’s country of ori-
gin often playing a decisive role for the outcome of the application. This unsatisfactory
situation largely motivated the introduction of the Federal Recognition Act (Anerken-
nungsgesetz) in April 2012 whose aim was to simplify, standardize and accelerate the
7In some circumstances, and on an individual case basis, these fees may be paid by other administrative
entities. For example, prior to submitting an application, unemployed applicants or applicants registered
as job seekers can seek clarification from their local employment offices or job centres whether they will
cover the costs of the procedure. The labor administration authorities only provide such support if they
consider the recognition of a foreign training qualification necessary for the holder to be integrated into
the labor market. In these cases, adaptation measures such as continuing training courses or examination
preparations may also be funded.
8For more details about the potential outcomes, see https://www.bq-portal.de/de
9The relevant legislation was the EU Directive 2005/36/EC on the recognition of professional quali-
fications, which came into force on 20 October 2005 and was introduced in Germany in 2007.
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procedure for the recognition of foreign qualifications governed by federal law, and open
up such procedures to groups not covered by previous legislation.10 However, 80 per-
cent of immigrants in our sample applied for recognition before April 2012, so that our
estimates largely reflect observations under the old legislative regime.
3 Empirical Framework
In the administrative component of our data set, we are able to continuously track im-
migrants after their arrival in Germany. We also know from the survey component if and
when they receive occupational recognition. We exploit this information to compare the
labor market outcomes of individuals after successful recognition with those of individu-
als who have either not yet received recognition or never applied for it. To facilitate the
interpretation of our results, and because of limited sample sizes, we only consider full
recognitions as successful and exclude individuals with partial or denied recognition.
Adopting a standard difference-in-differences approach, we start with the following
fixed effects regression to obtain an overall estimate of the impact of recognition:
yit = βCertRecogit+X
′
itγ+λt+λp+λi+ εit. (1)
The variable yit denotes a specific labor market outcome of individual i at time t. In
particular, we examine the impact of occupational recognition on an immigrant’s employ-
ment, wages, and an index tracking the degree of regulation of the observed occupation
(which we discuss in more detail in the next section). The first two outcomes provide
general insights into the effects of occupational recognition on immigrants’ labor market
performance and are particularly important when viewed in the context of the rather
poor employment and wage outcomes of immigrants, documented in much of the migra-
tion literature (for Germany, see, for example, Algan et al., 2010). The latter outcome
is more specific to our setup and provides insights into the mechanism through which
occupational recognition affects labor market outcomes. In particular, it sheds light on
the central question whether occupational recognition indeed allows immigrants to move
into regulated occupations. By running the regressions first without conditioning on im-
migrants’ employment status, assigning a level of zero regulation to non-employment,
and then conditional on employment, we are able to assess whether the movements into
10An additional shortcoming before the introduction of the Recognition Act was the absence of a bind-
ing time frame for processing the applications which lead to sometimes unnecessarily lengthy procedures.
With the introduction of the Recognition Act, the maximum duration for the recognition process was
mandated, with the responsible authorities now having to make a decision within 3 months of receipt of
the applicant’s full documentation (with a single extension possible in difficult cases). This acceleration
of the recognition process is already noticeable in our sample, where the average duration between appli-
cation and final decision was 5.5 months before the introduction of the Recognition Act (with a standard
deviation of 13.4 months) and 3.8 months afterwards (with a standard deviation of 3.6 months).
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regulated occupations occur primarily out of non-employment or through gradual job
changes from unregulated to regulated occupations.
The main regressor of interest, CertRecogit, is a dummy variable taking the value one
if individual i has a foreign qualification that was recognized before or in time period t.
For individuals who never apply, this value is zero for all time periods. We are interested
in identifying β, the causal effect of occupational recognition on labor market outcomes.
For this, we require that, in the absence of recognition, the outcomes of individuals who
receive full recognition would have evolved in the same way as those of individuals who
have either not yet applied or who never apply during our observation window. Below
we explain how we assess the validity of this crucial identification assumption based on
observable differences in the pre-trends between treatment and control group. To control
for general changes in labor market conditions, for example due to seasonal variation
or business cycle fluctuations, we include time (month × year) fixed effects (λt) in our
estimation of equation (1). We also add a full set of months since migration fixed ef-
fects (λp) which capture the dynamic evolution of immigrants’ labor market outcomes
as a result of their ongoing integration into the host country’s economy. To account
for time-invariant observable and unobservable heterogeneity, we further include a full
set of individual fixed effects (λi). Their inclusion accounts for much of the personal
characteristics associated with better labor market outcomes and the selection into the
occupational recognition process, such as country of origin, gender, the level of education
before migration, and time-invariant ability and motivation. In addition to the compre-
hensive set of fixed effects, we also control for a quadratic term in age11 in the spirit of
Mincerian wage equations and a proxy for German language proficiency (Xit) to capture
further heterogeneity in the labor market trajectories of immigrants.12 We cluster stan-
dard errors at the individual level as suggested for difference-in-differences estimations by
Bertrand et al. (2004), thus allowing the error terms to be heteroscedastic and arbitrarily
correlated over time for a given individual.
To evaluate the sensitivity of our results to changes in behavior after applying for
recognition, we also include an indicator variable that switches on during the time pe-
riod between initial application and final recognition in an alternative specification. It
is possible that after submitting their application, individuals wait for the outcome of
the recognition process and, if unemployed, search less intensively for a new job or, if
employed, stop working altogether or put less effort into their on-going jobs (and thus
earn lower wages). On the other hand, being in the process of applying for occupational
recognition may already serve as a positive signal in the labor market, improving ap-
11Since we include both individual and time fixed effects, the linear age effect is not separately iden-
tified.
12The survey provides information on self-reported language proficiency at two points in time, before
migration and at the time of the interview. Linearly interpolating between the two data points, we
construct proxies for language proficiency at monthly intervals.
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plicants’ labor market outcomes. By including the application dummy, we ensure that
our estimate of β, which measures the change in the outcome variable after recognition
relative to the control group, are not confounded by this type of anticipatory behavior.
While specification (1) provides a useful summary measure of the average impact of
occupational recognition on employment, wages and the degree of regulation in immi-
grants’ occupations, it conceals valuable information about the dynamic process through
which the effects of recognition evolve over time. As an extension, we therefore introduce
individual dummy variables for the months around the date of recognition as additional
regressors, allowing us to distinguish between short- and long-term labor market effects
in an event study type setup. More specifically, we use the regression model:
yit =
−1∑
q=−24
δt−qCertRecogMthi,t−q + δt+25CertRecogi,t+25
+
60∑
q=1
δt−qCertRecogMthi,t−q + δt−61CertRecogi,t−61
+X ′itγ+λt+λp+λi+ εit,
(2)
where the dummy variables CertRecogMthi,t−q, which equal one if individual i’s qualifi-
cation was recognized in period t−q, now capture the effect of occupational recognition in
specific months around the recognition date. We create these dummy variables starting
24 months before the recognition date and ending 60 months thereafter. All dummy vari-
ables are equal to one only in the relevant time period and zero otherwise. For example,
CertRecogMthi,t−10 is equal to one when the successful recognition was ten months be-
fore period t, so that the corresponding estimate δt−10 measures the effect of recognition
ten months after it was obtained. CertRecogi,t−61 is a dummy variable for individuals
having a foreign qualification that was recognized before or in period t− 61. Thus, δt−61
picks up the long-run average effect of recognition on labor market outcomes during all
months more than five years after the recognition date. Similarly, CertRecogi,t+25 is
a dummy variable for all periods at least 25 months before an individual’s recognition
date. By definition, non-applicants get assigned zero for all these dummy variables. Im-
portantly, equation (2) does not include a separate dummy variable for the time period
when recognition was actually obtained (q = 0), so that the estimated dynamic effects of
recognition are measured relative to this baseline period.13 Just as for the static analysis,
it is possible to control for the timing of the application by including a dummy for the
application period as an additional regressor.
The main concern regarding our difference-in-differences approach is that unobserved
time-varying factors related to both labor market outcomes and the recognition process
13Any level differences in outcomes between treatment and control group in the time period when
recognition was obtained are absorbed by the individual fixed effects λi, so that the effect of recognition
in this baseline period is essentially normalized to zero.
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might confound our estimation results. The inclusion of separate dummy variables for
the months prior to recognition allows us to directly assess the relevance of this type of
endogeneity as it would typically manifest itself through a violation of the parallel trends
assumption. For instance, if some positive labor market shock (e.g. landing a new job)
incentivizes an immigrant to apply for recognition (maybe because that would allow the
worker to further advance in the new job), diverging trends in labor market outcomes
relative to the control group should already materialize before the official recognition is
received. Conversely, if in anticipation of a positive recognition outcome, applicants hold
back in the labor market even before submitting their application, a deterioration in their
labor market trajectories relative to non-applicants should show up in the pre-recognition
period. The observation of insignificant estimates close to zero in all months prior to the
actual recognition date and significant effects moving away from zero soon after would
lend support to a causal interpretation of our findings.
While the relatively small sample size of treated individuals with full recognition in
our data prevents us from following alternative approaches for the estimation of dynamic
treatment effects (see e.g. Fredriksson and Johansson, 2008, Crépon et al., 2009, or
Vikström, 2017), we also use a pooled version of the synthetic control method developed
by Abadie et al. (2010) to further check the robustness of our findings. In this approach,
each immigrant who receives full recognition is matched to an appropriate control group
of immigrants who never applied for recognition but whose labor market outcomes in the
period prior to application are similar to those of the treated immigrant. Appendix A.2
provides more details on the implementation of this alternative procedure and documents
the corresponding findings, which largely corroborate our main regression-based results.
4 Data
The basis of our empirical analysis are the first three waves of a novel longitudinal survey
of people with migration background in Germany, the IAB-SOEP Migration Sample
(Brücker et al., 2014). This survey, jointly conducted by the Institute for Employment
Research (IAB) and the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), was initiated in 2013
and designed to oversample recent immigrants who arrived in Germany after 1994.14 The
initial sample comprised around 5,000 first- and second-generation immigrants who were
14The sampling of anchor persons proceeded as follows. In a first step, the IEB records were restricted
to individuals who first appeared in the data after 1994. Individuals with a migration background were
then identified based on their foreign, i.e. non-German, citizenship or their participation in measures
of the Federal Employment Agency specifically designed for persons with a migration background (e.g.
language classes). A short screening interview was then conducted with each cooperating anchor person
after which around 30 percent of all households were screened out because anchor persons turned out not
to be part of the target population. In more than half of the cases, screen-out was due to immigration
before 1995 and in about one-third of the cases to not having a migration background. Note that other
interviewed household members might have arrived in Germany before 1995.
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then interviewed on an annual basis, with a refreshment sample added every year to deal
with sample attrition. The most innovative feature of this data set is its linkage with the
German administrative data of the IEB (the so-called Integrierte Erwerbsbiografie), which
comprise full employment histories of the universe of workers covered by the social security
system in Germany during the period 1975 to 2014.15 For data protection reasons,
respondents to the survey component of the IAB-SOEP Migration Sample were asked
to give their prior consent to the record linkage by signing a corresponding statement.
The overall approval rate was about 50 percent, giving rise to a linked sample of 2,606
individuals: 1,992 from the first wave, 48 from the second wave, and 566 from the third
wave. Out of this sample, we only consider first generation immigrants in our analysis and
further exclude those individuals with missing information on the variables of interest.
The linked IAB-SOEP Migration Sample is particularly suited for our analysis for
two reasons. First, the survey component contains detailed information on occupational
qualifications obtained both before migration and after arrival in Germany. Importantly,
this includes a full module devoted to the recognition process of foreign qualifications,
with information about the month and year when the application process was initiated
and the month and year when a final decision (denial, partial recognition, full recognition)
was obtained.16 Second, the social security component of the data allows us to observe an
immigrant’s entire work history after arrival in Germany. Linking the information about
the precise timing of the recognition process to the spell structure of the administrative
data, we can observe each individual’s labor market outcomes before, during, and after
the application process at monthly intervals.
We construct all our monthly outcome variables from the administrative spell data
of the IEB. Employment is measured as the share of days during which an individual is
in contractual employment in a given month (thus varying between 0 and 1).17 Wages
in the IEB are measured as log gross daily wages which we average across all full-time
spells in a given month and translate into hourly wages by dividing by 8.18 As indicated
before, we also use an index tracking the degree of regulation in an immigrant’s current
occupation. The use of an index is necessary because even though each 8-digit occupation
in the German system can be unambiguously classified as either regulated (licensed) or
unregulated, occupations in the IEB data are not recorded at such fine level of disaggre-
gation. We therefore employ the mapping constructed by Vicari (2014) in which, based
on information from the full IEB-registry for the year 2012, each 3-digit occupation is
15Civil servants, self-employed and military personnel are thus excluded from the IEB.
16There are also few cases where the status is pending and the individual still waiting for the result of
the application. We exclude those cases from our analysis.
17The administrative data refer only to formal employment so that we cannot observe movements from
informal to formal employment.
18Wages in the administrative data are right-censored at the social security contribution ceiling. This
does not constitute a major issue in the context of this study since immigrants in Germany tend to earn
wages well below the censoring limit.
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assigned an index that represents the share of 8-digit subcategories within that occupa-
tion that requires a formal recognition of foreign qualifications in order to be accessible
for immigrants. Weighting each 8-digit occupation by its relative size among the working
population, the index ranges from zero (no subcategories requiring recognition) to one
(all subcategories requiring recognition). We use this continuous index as a proxy for
working in a regulated occupation.19
To provide some examples, Table 1 reports the ten 3-digit occupations with the highest
(Panel A) and lowest (Panel B) share of regulated 8-digit occupations.20 Apart from the
value of the regulation index, we report the fraction of the working population employed
in each of these occupation, the average hourly wage in the occupation, the annual rate of
wage growth and the rate of wage growth over the first three years in an occupation. The
descriptive evidence shows that average wages in the ten occupations with the highest
degree of regulation are significantly higher than average wages in the ten occupations
with the lowest degree of regulation, 11.70 vs. 8.73 euros per hour. In addition, occupa-
tions with a higher degree of regulation are also characterized by faster wage growth. For
example, those working in the ten most regulated occupations have an average annual
(first 3-year) wage growth of 3.76 (17.05) percent compared to 3.12 (13.45) percent for
those working in the ten least regulated occupations. These positive associations between
wage levels and wage growth on the one hand and the degree of occupational regulation
on the other hand is also more generally detectable in the data. For example, regressing
occupation-specific log hourly wages and annual wage growth rates on the regulation in-
dex yields positive and highly significant coefficients of 0.425 (0.001) and 0.373 (0.020),
respectively.
As mentioned above, we restrict our sample to foreign-born individuals who either
eventually receive full recognition or never apply for recognition during our observation
window.21 Out of this group, we select all individuals who migrated to Germany aged 18
or older and who remained in Germany thereafter. We further only consider observations
for prime working age individuals aged between 25 and 59 and exclude individuals with a
known incapacity for work. Finally, we condition on having requested recognition before
2015 to be able to observe post-recognition outcomes in the administrative data (which
end in 2014). Our final estimation sample consists of 1,218 individuals, of which 140
receive full recognition and 1,078 never apply for recognition, either because they do not
19Note that if the distribution of immigrants with full recognition across 8-digit subcategories were
the same as that of the existing working population, the interpretation of our parameter of interest β
would be the same whether we use our continuous regulation index on the 3-digit level as the dependent
variable or a binary measure on the 8-digit level for whether or not a specific occupation is regulated.
In both cases, β would reflect the increase in the probability of working in a regulated occupation.
20The reported order of occupations is obtained after sorting by the index value and the fraction of
the working population.
21The samples of immigrants whose application was denied (33) or who obtained only partial recogni-
tion (45) are too small to study separately in a meaningful way.
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Table 1: Regulated and Unregulated Occupations
Index of Fraction of Mean Annual Rate of First 3 Years Rate
Regulation Working Pop. % Wage Wage Growth % of Wage Growth %
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A. First 10 Occupations with High Degree of Regulation
Occupations in human medicine and dentistry 1.000 0.544 16.443 4.655 32.508
Occupations in veterinary medicine and non-medical animal health practitioners 1.000 0.020 12.335 4.808 22.104
Teachers in schools of general education 0.991 0.351 13.228 3.143 13.089
Occupations in police and criminal investigation, jurisdiction and the penal institution 0.875 0.038 9.270 2.586 10.782
Occupations in nursing, emergency medical services and obstetrics 0.760 2.223 9.458 3.523 19.827
Occupations in technical research and development 0.753 1.752 14.015 2.795 11.179
Occupations in construction scheduling and supervision, and architecture 0.708 0.816 13.907 2.786 13.534
Occupations in geriatric care 0.628 0.102 7.034 7.272 18.007
Occupations in education and social work, and pedagogic specialists in social care work 0.445 2.151 9.454 3.365 17.045
Ship’s officers and masters 0.442 0.072 11.827 2.620 12.450
First 10 occupations (unweighted average) 0.760 0.807 11.697 3.755 17.052
Panel B. Last 10 Occupations with Low Degree of Regulation
Sales occupations in retail trade (without product specialisation) 0.000 4.262 6.844 3.689 16.922
Driver of vehicles in road traffic 0.000 3.497 8.849 1.613 9.523
Occupations in metalworking 0.000 3.083 9.684 2.714 13.842
Trading occupations 0.000 1.581 11.048 3.747 16.606
Gastronomy occupations 0.000 1.230 5.443 3.552 13.457
Drivers and operators of construction and transportation vehicles and equipment 0.000 0.793 9.896 1.779 6.780
Occupations in housekeeping and consumer counselling 0.000 0.653 5.977 2.637 11.331
Occupations in technical media design 0.000 0.419 10.684 3.150 17.591
Occupations in advertising and marketing 0.000 0.339 11.779 4.327 14.162
Occupations in hotels 0.000 0.272 7.074 4.007 14.243
Last 10 occupations (unweighted average) 0.000 1.613 8.728 3.121 13.446
Note: Data source: IEB data. Panel A refers to the first 10 occupations with the highest value of the regulation index. Panel B refers to the last 10 occupations with the lowest value of the regulation
index. The index is provided by Vicari (2014) and is weighted according to the working population in each occupation in the full IEB registry in 2012. All descriptive values are computed using a 2 percent
sample of the full (including immigrants and natives) IEB registry and refer to the years 1975-2014. Wages refer to the average real gross hourly wage considering all full-time spells. To mitigate the
effect of outliers, we exclude the top and bottom 0.1 percentiles of the wage distribution. The rate of annual wage growth (column 4) refers to the within occupation relative difference in wages across two
consecutive years. The first 3-year rate of wage growth (column 5) refers to the within occupation wage difference between the first and third year in a given occupation, relative to the first year wage.
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have a foreign certificate with which to apply (568) or because they have one but choose
not to apply (510).
Table 2 shows a number of descriptive statistics for our estimation sample which
comprises individuals who receive full recognition (column 1) and individuals who did not
apply for recognition (column 4). For completeness, we also report descriptive statistics
for those in the survey who only received partial recognition (column 2) or were denied
recognition (column 3). Focusing first on the full recognition sample, we see that 42.9
percent of the immigrants are men, aged 41.8 years on average in their last observable
spell in our data. The schooling level of these immigrants is relatively high with 11.0 years
of education (not counting tertiary education). The table also provides information about
the typical migration and recognition process. On average, immigrants entered Germany
when they were 31.3 years old. After that, they take on average about 8 months before
making an official recognition request. One of the reasons for this delay could be the
demanding recognition process which is one of the most important reasons reported by
those deciding not to apply (12.9 percent), together with the lack of knowledge about how
to apply (6.6 percent) and the bureaucratic and time-consuming nature of the process (6.6
percent). After on average 5.2 months, successful immigrants get to know the result of
their application. However, as indicated by the large standard deviation of 12.1 months,
there is significant variation in the waiting times.
Table 2 also provides information about each group’s labor market outcomes, both
during the first year after arrival in Germany and across all available time periods. In
general, there are significant improvements in the employment rate between the first
year and subsequent periods, particularly for those who applied for recognition. Average
hourly wages for the full recognition and non-applicant group, in contrast, do not increase
over time which is most likely due to strong positive selection into employment in the
first year after arrival. When comparing across immigrant groups, there is substantial
heterogeneity. Immigrants who obtain full recognition perform better in terms of wages
relative to all other groups and in terms of initial employment relative to the two other
applicant groups. They also tend to be younger when making their request than those
immigrants whose application is eventually denied. Across all groups, the largest group in
terms of country of origin are immigrants from the former USSR, mostly ethnic Germans,
followed by immigrants from South East Europe. Given the heterogeneity in observable
characteristics between the different immigrant groups, we analyze the robustness of
our main results by replicating the analysis on the restricted sample of immigrants who
eventually all received full recognition, thus only exploiting the differential timing of their
recognition process for identification.
Unfortunately, until the third wave, the IAB-SOEP Migration Sample did not ask
respondents explicitly for which specific occupation or field of study they requested recog-
nition. If that information were available, we could separately study the labor market
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics by Recognition Outcome
Full Recognition Partial Recognition Denied Recognition Non-Applicant
Panel A. Immigrants
Male % 42.9 48.5 33.3 46.6
(49.7) (50.8) (47.7) (49.9)
Yrs. Schooling 11.0 10.1 10.0 10.4
(1.7) (2.0) (1.4) (2.1)
Age Last Spell 41.8 43.1 44.9 41.2
(9.6) (8.5) (8.5) (9.6)
Age at first Migration 31.3 29.5 32.8 31.3
(7.4) (7.2) (8.5) (8.9)
Age at Request of Recognition 32.1 32.3 35.4
(7.5) (9.8) (9.2)
Time Request to Result (Month) 5.2 12.2 4.1
(12.1) (23.2) (6.8)
West % 9.3 0.0 2.2 12.2
(29.1) (0.0) (14.9) (32.7)
East Europe % 12.9 12.1 4.4 16.3
(33.6) (33.1) (20.8) (37.0)
South East Europe % 25.7 15.2 8.9 22.4
(43.9) (36.4) (28.8) (41.7)
USSR % 35.7 57.6 68.9 28.6
(48.1) (50.2) (46.8) (45.2)
Others % 16.4 15.2 15.6 20.6
(37.2) (36.4) (36.7) (40.5)
Panel B. Observations - First Year In Germany
Employed % 29.7 13.0 7.6 31.2
(45.7) (33.7) (26.5) (46.3)
Index Regulation % 10.6 3.7 1.1 2.4
(27.6) (16.0) (9.7) (10.3)
Real Hourly Wage 12.7 7.5 5.2 9.0
(5.2) (2.4) (2.7) (5.4)
Panel C. Observations - Average Over Time
Employed % 66.1 52.9 53.5 58.3
(47.3) (49.9) (49.9) (49.3)
Index Regulation % 13.7 11.9 7.7 3.8
(27.4) (25.4) (22.0) (12.4)
Real Hourly Wage 10.7 8.8 7.5 8.7
(5.1) (4.2) (3.5) (4.3)
Individuals 140 33 45 1,078
Note. Data source: IAB-SOEP Migration Sample linked to IEB data. Statistics depicted are means with standard devi-
ations in parentheses. Statistics are based on individuals in upper panel and on monthly observations in the lower two
panels. Employed % compares time periods of employment to times of employment and non-employment. Because in-
formation on regulated occupations is not available at the level of the single occupation, but only at the aggregate level
of the regulation index provided by the IAB, each occupation has a degree of regulation corresponding to the regulation
index ranging between 0 and 1. The table reports the average regulation index for the respective groups in the sample.
Real hourly wages are constructed from daily wage information using only full-time spells and assuming that full-time
employment is 8 hours per day.
effects for regulated and unregulated occupations, which would allow us to distinguish
the pure signalling effect of occupational recognition from the effect arising due to bet-
ter access to certain occupations.22 What we do observe in all three waves of the data,
however, is the general type of certificate for which recognition is being requested, with
22Table A.1 in the appendix reports the occupational distribution for the 38 respondents in the re-
freshment sample of the third wave who received full recognition of their qualifications. In line with
official aggregate figures, most of these occupations are indeed regulated (71.1 percent) and require com-
paratively high skill levels, such as nurses and doctors (23.7 percent of recognitions), engineers (13.2
percent), veterinaries (10.5 percent) and teachers (7.9 percent).
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the highest fraction applying for the recognition of a college/university degree (57.0 per-
cent), followed by a vocational training (36.0 percent), a doctoral degree (4.5 percent)
and some other education (2.5 percent). In the first two waves, we also observe the type
of authority to which immigrants applied for recognition, which can be used as a proxy
for seeking recognition of a regulated or unregulated occupation (see Section 5.3).
5 Main Results
In this section, we first present estimates of the average impact of recognition on em-
ployment, wages and the regulation index and check the robustness of these findings to
different sample definitions. We then graphically show the results from our dynamic
specification, followed by an analysis of heterogeneous treatment effects in terms of im-
migrants’ characteristics and key features of their recognition process.
5.1 Static Effects
In Panel A of Table 3, we report the static results from our baseline specification (1). In
Panel B, we add a dummy that turns on during the application period as an additional
control variable to deal with any potential anticipatory behavior on the part of the ap-
plicants. The estimate in column (1) of Panel A shows that obtaining full occupational
recognition increases the share of days in employment per month by 16.0 percentage
points, suggesting that occupational recognition helps immigrants find and maintain em-
ployment. In the specification including the dummy for the application period (Panel B),
the effect of receiving full recognition increases slightly to 16.5 percentage points. The
point estimate for having applied, in turn, is close to zero and statistically not significant,
indicating that applying in itself neither serves as a positive signal in the labor market nor
does it reduce employment outcomes, for example because of a lower job search intensity
in anticipation of the final result of the application.23 In most of the following discussion
of our findings, we nonetheless focus on the specification with an included dummy for
the application period. Column (2) shows the results of occupational recognition for log
wages. Full recognition increases wages by 17.0 percent (15.7 log points) according to
Panel A and 15.1 percent (14.1 log points) according to Panel B, suggesting that recogni-
tion enables immigrants to more effectively utilize their skills in the host country’s labor
market. Note, however, that the coefficient in Panel B is not significant at conventional
levels.
Column (3) shows that after recognition, immigrants move increasingly into more
regulated jobs, with the regulation index of their occupations increasing by around 15
23An observationally equivalent explanation would be that both effects exist but that they compensate
each other.
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Table 3: Occupational Recognition and Average Labor Market Outcomes
Log Wages Regulation Regulation Index
Employment (Full-time) Index (Employed)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A
Received full recognition 0.160*** 0.157* 0.150*** 0.114**
(0.050) (0.080) (0.033) (0.056)
Panel B
Application period 0.024 -0.053 0.009 0.065
(0.067) (0.105) (0.035) (0.065)
Received full recognition 0.165*** 0.141 0.152*** 0.129*
(0.052) (0.103) (0.035) (0.068)
Individuals 1,218 830 1,218 1,081
with recognition 140 114 140 132
without recognition 1,078 716 1,078 949
Observations 136,306 50,971 129,471 74,003
Note. Data source: IAB-SOEP Migration Sample linked to IEB data. Panel A reports the estimates based
on specification (1), Panel B adds a dummy variable for the application period as discussed in the text.
The dependent variable is the share of days in employment per month in column (1), log real hourly wages
for full-time employees averaged over all spells in a given month in column (2), the index of occupational
regulation, assigning a value of zero to the non-employed, in column (3), and the index of occupational
regulation in column (4). Additional controls are individual fixed effects, time fixed effects, time since mi-
gration fixed effects, age squared, and German language proficiency.
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the individual level: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
percentage points on average. Since, for this estimation, we keep non-employed immi-
grants in the sample and set their regulation indices equal to zero, some of the positive
effect is likely driven by the significant movement from non-employment to employment
shown in column (1). However, given a mean regulation index of 0.066 for employed im-
migrants without recognition (0.130 for the 90th percentile), the estimated coefficient is
large, suggesting that part of the increase is also driven by movements from unregulated
to regulated occupations. To investigate this possibility, we study the effect of occupa-
tional recognition on the regulation index conditional on being employed in column (4).
For the subset of employed workers, full occupational recognition leads to a move into
occupations that are on average 12.9 percentage points more likely to be regulated. The
similarity between the results in the last two columns suggests that movements into more
regulated occupations happen to a similar extent from non-employment and unregulated
jobs.
Table A.2 in the appendix provides robustness checks with respect to our sample
selection procedure by introducing additional restrictions one at a time. Column (4)
restates the baseline results of Table 3 with our preferred and most restrictive sample.
In column (1), we impose only the restriction of having migrated after the age of 18.
Compared to our baseline results the effects are smaller, notably for the wage outcome. In
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column (2), we then exclude individuals who have an incapacity for work. The estimated
effects of full recognition on employment, wages and the regulation index all increase
somewhat, with the largest impact being on the employment outcome where the estimate
increases from 0.149 to 0.172. In column (3), we impose the additional restriction of only
including observations for individuals of prime working age (age 25-59). This leads to a
lowering of the employment effect towards our baseline estimate but otherwise only minor
changes. Finally, we exclude individuals that migrated to Germany more than once in
column (4) which leads to an increase in the estimate for log real wages. We exclude
these individuals in our preferred specification since we do not know their labor market
outcomes during their time outside of Germany. Overall, the particular sample selection
rules do not seem to have a large impact on the magnitude of our main estimates.
Table A.3 in the appendix shows how our estimates of the impact of occupational
recognition on the different labor market outcomes vary with the set of control variables
included in the specification. After controlling for time since migration and individual
fixed effects, the further inclusion of time fixed effects, the quadratic age profile and the
German proficiency control has little impact on our point estimates.
5.2 Dynamic Effects
We now turn our attention to the results from the dynamic specification given in equa-
tion (2). In all reported estimations, we include a dummy for the application period and
use the same sample restrictions as for the static main results in Table 3. For better
readability, we plot the estimates of the period-specific effects δt−q graphically together
with their corresponding 90% and 95% confidence intervals. Figure 1 displays the effects
of occupational recognition on employment (upper left panel), log real wages (upper right
panel), the regulation index including the non-employed (lower left panel) and the regu-
lation index conditional on employment (lower right panel) in the 24 months before and
60 months after recognition.
In the months after receiving full recognition, the difference in the share of days per
month in employment increases rapidly relative to the control group, reaching 17.1 per-
centage points after 12 months. After that, the employment gap continues to grow albeit
at a slower rate, reaching a value of 24.5 percentage points three years after recognition
and stabilizing thereafter at slightly lower levels. This pattern suggests that occupational
recognition increases the labor market opportunities of immigrants relatively quickly fol-
lowing the positive decision, and that their employability stays higher even in the long
run, most likely due to their wider access to jobs. Reassuringly, there is no discernible
difference in employment rates between those immigrants who obtain recognition within
the following 24 months and those who do not, as indicated by the small and insignificant
parameter estimates prior to the recognition date.
The corresponding dynamic pattern for log wages (upper right panel), shows an in-
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Figure 1: Dynamic Effects of Occupational Recognition
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Note. Data source: IAB-SOEP Migration Sample linked to IEB data. The figures report the coefficients of the period
dummies obtained from estimating regressions of specification (2) including a dummy for the application period. The
dependent variable is the share of days in employment per month (upper left panel), log real wages for full-time employees
(upper right panel), the index of occupational regulation, assigning a value of zero to the non-employed (lower left panel) and
the index of occupational regulation (lower right panel). Additional controls are: the long-run average effect after recognition
(CertRecogi,t−61), the long-run average effect before recognition (CertRecogi,t+25) an indicator for the application period,
individual fixed effects, time fixed effects, time since migration fixed effects, age squared, and German language proficiency.
90% and 95% confidence intervals displayed using clustered standard errors at the individual level. Values of the confidence
interval in the wage graph are cut at -0.5 for presentation purposes.
crease of the relative wage differential over time without any immediate jump. After
receiving recognition, there is an increase in hourly wages that reaches 8.1 percent (7.8
log points) after one year and 19.8 percent (18.1 log points) after three years. From then
onwards, the wage differential relative to those without occupational recognition levels
off and coefficients fluctuate around a difference of around 16 percent. The reason for
the delayed onset of significant wage gains from occupational recognition could be due
to the fact that it takes time for immigrants to locate jobs in the higher paying and now
accessible regulated segment of the labor market. It could also be that employers’ re-
main initially skeptical regarding the equivalence between foreign and native credentials,
and that this skepticism is only overcome with time. While somewhat more noisy due
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to the smaller sample size of employed immigrants, there is once again no evidence of
a significant wage gap in the months prior to recognition, especially in the immediately
preceeding year, lending credibility to the claim that the subsequent positive wage effects
are indeed causally related to the occupational recognition.
The dynamic results with respect to the occupational regulation index in the lower
panel of the figure provide further insights into the ways immigrants gain employment
after recognition by entering increasingly more regulated occupations. When including
non-employed individuals in the estimation (lower left panel), there is a rapid increase
in the regulation index starting immediately after recognition by 9.6 percentage points
after 12 months. Subsequently, the occupations chosen by immigrants with successful
occupational recognition continue to have a higher regulation index compared to those of
immigrants’ without recognition, with the gap increasing to 17.4 percentage points after
three years. This delay until all occupational adjustments after recognition materialize
is likely due to difficulties of locating a suitable job in the regulated market segment for
some migrants.
When considering the effect of recognition on the regulation index conditional on
employment (lower right panel), the pattern is slightly different. In this case, we do
not observe differentials in the regulation of occupations between immigrants with and
without occupational recognition until about 12 months after recognition, mirroring the
corresponding pattern for log wages. Only after this initial time period, the relative move-
ments into more regulated occupations become significant, evident by a steady increase
in our sequence of estimates. After three years, the relative increase in the probability of
working in a regulated occupation amounts to 11.5 percentage points and remains more
or less constant over the remaining time period. Taken together, these two dynamic
regressions show that a successful recognition is helpful in securing employment in reg-
ulated occupations. Initially, these employment gains are mostly due to non-employed
workers finding jobs in the regulated segment but after some delay, there is also a shift
among employed workers into more regulated occupations. These observations are in line
with the suggested mechanism underlying the slow wage growth. Securing a regulated
occupation does not directly imply higher wages. But the continuous employment in
these occupations, which tend to be the jobs with higher wages and faster wage growth,
generate the observed long-term wage effects.
The evidence presented in this section suggests that immigrants who have not yet
applied for recognition and those who never apply can serve as a reasonable control
group in our difference-in-differences setting. As a robustness check, we redo the analysis
but restrict the sample to only those immigrants who eventually all get full recognition.
By focussing a priori on this group of immigrants, we reduce observable and unobservable
heterogeneity in the sample, and identify the parameters of interest exclusively from the
differential timing of the recognition processes across individuals (compare e.g. Arai and
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Thoursie, 2009, for a similar approach). As Figure A.1 and Table A.4 in the appendix
show, our main results are robust to this alternative identification strategy, with average
employment and wage effects slightly higher and movements into regulated occupations
slightly lower. Similarly, the results from the pooled synthetic control method reported in
Appendix A.2 confirm that occupational recognition has positive effects on immigrants’
employment, hourly wages and probability of working in a regulated occupation.
5.3 Heterogeneous Effects
Our results so far speak to the overall static and dynamic effects of occupational recogni-
tion on immigrants’ labor market outcomes. In this section, we study the heterogeneity
of these effects across a number of different dimensions. Because of our relatively small
sample size, several of the estimates in this section suffer from low precision, making it
hard to draw strong conclusions. Table 4 presents results where we allow the treatment
effect to vary by the type of foreign certificate for which immigrants applied for recog-
nition. As mentioned before, we do not observe the exact certified occupation or field
of study of a successful applicant, but we do observe the broad educational category for
which recognition is requested, allowing us to distinguish four groups: vocational training,
college/university degree, doctoral degree and any other education.24
The empirical results suggest that the recognition process is important for most types
of qualifications. Except for the category of other education, all coefficients for employ-
ment and wage regressions are positive though in several case not statistically significant.
The group with a doctoral degree benefits the most with an employment increase of 45.6
percentage points and a wage effect of 35.7 percent (30.5 log points), followed by the
group with vocational training with an employment effect of 26.9 percentage points and
an insignificant wage effect of 6.3 percent (6.1 log points). The movement into regulated
occupations is similar for the groups with vocational training and college/university de-
grees. For the group with doctoral studies, the movement from non-employment into
regulated occupations is particularly important. Conditional on being employed, the co-
efficient is actually negative, although not significant, suggesting that these immigrants
remain unemployed until they get a position in their desired regulated occupation.
A complementary analysis considers heterogeneous effects across the different types
of authorities to which immigrants apply for recognition. To which specific institutions
immigrants must apply depends on the particular occupation or field of study for which
they seek recognition. Different authorities are associated with more or less regulated
occupations, allowing us to use the information on the recognizing authority as a proxy
24The reported education levels in the survey are, in decreasing order: 1. doctoral degree, 2. university
education, 3. college education, 4. vocational school, 5. apprenticeship, 6. practical training, 7. other
education, 8. missing. We aggregate groups 2 and 3 into the group “college/university degree” and
groups 4-6 into the group “vocational training”. Since every immigrant with full recognition provided
valid information about his or her education level, there is no “missing” category in Table 4.
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Table 4: Static Effects by Type of Recognized Certificate
Log Wages Regulation Regulation Index
Employment (Full-time) Index (Employed)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Application period 0.026 -0.041 0.005 0.062
(0.065) (0.104) (0.035) (0.066)
Full recognition of
vocational training 0.269*** 0.061 0.164** 0.189
(0.055) (0.174) (0.065) (0.122)
college/university degree 0.101 0.161 0.132*** 0.135**
(0.070) (0.122) (0.039) (0.065)
doctoral degree 0.456*** 0.305 0.431** -0.261
(0.095) (0.261) (0.178) (0.601)
other education -0.148 0.261*** -0.026*** -0.008
(0.130) (0.028) (0.009) (0.015)
Individuals 1,218 830 1,218 1,081
with recognition 140 114 140 132
without recognition 1,078 716 1,078 949
Observations 136,306 50,971 129,471 74,003
Note. Data source: IAB-SOEP Migration Sample linked to IEB data. The estimates are based on specifica-
tion (1) including a dummy for the application period and separate treatment dummies for individuals with
vocational training, university/college degree, doctoral degree and other education as their highest level of
foreign training for which they requested recognition. The dependent variable is the share of days in employ-
ment per month in column (1), log real wages for full-time employees in column (2), the index of occupational
regulation, assigning a value of zero to non-employed in column (3), and the index of occupational regulation
in column (4). Additional controls are individual fixed effects, time fixed effects, time since migration fixed
effects, age squared, and German language proficiency. For individuals with several foreign certificates, the
highest in terms of educational value is chosen.
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the individual level: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
for recognition of a regulated versus unregulated occupation. We distinguish between five
broad groups: the Chamber of Crafts, the Chamber of Industry and Commerce, and the
Office for the Recognition of Foreign University Degrees, all of which are dealing primarily
with unregulated occupations, and the Chambers of Physicians, Dentists, Veterinarians
and Pharmacists, and Other Institutions, which are dealing primarily with regulated
occupations.25
As shown in Table 5, for trained physicians, dentists, veterinarians, and pharmacists,
the benefits from obtaining a recognition are substantial, with an employment effect of
50.6 percentage points and a wage effect of 235.0 percent (120.9 log points). While this
wage effect appears large, it is comparable to the findings by Kugler and Sauer (2005) who
find a return to a medical license for immigrants in Israel between 180 and 340 percent.
There is also a large impact on the probability of working in a regulated occupation, with
25To identify the particular authority responsible for the recognition of specific occupations we use in-
formation from https://www.anerkennung-in-deutschland.de/. The exact assignment can deviate within
occupation, since rules vary by region and the information provided only reflects the current situation.
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Table 5: Static Effects by Type of Recognizing Authority
Log Wage Regulation Regulation Index
Employment (Full-time) Index (Employed)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Application period 0.023 -0.043 0.005 0.063
(0.074) (0.092) (0.032) (0.062)
Full recognition from
Chamber of Crafts 0.096 0.327*** 0.061 0.004
(0.120) (0.065) (0.058) (0.026)
Chamber of Industry and Commerce 0.258*** -0.005 0.067 0.193
(0.065) (0.251) (0.065) (0.181)
Office Recognition University Degree 0.109 0.434*** 0.102 0.072
(0.150) (0.106) (0.065) (0.280)
Chambers of Physicians, etc. 0.506*** 1.209*** 0.440*** 0.284***
(0.038) (0.115) (0.169) (0.064)
Other Institutions 0.114 0.028 0.197*** 0.195**
(0.083) (0.151) (0.062) (0.093)
Individuals 833 600 833 750
with recognition 99 82 99 93
without recognition 734 518 734 657
Observations 122,905 46,484 116,316 66,996
Note. Data source: IAB-SOEP Migration Sample linked to IEB data. The estimates are based on specification (1) includ-
ing a dummy for the application period and separate treatment dummies for recognition through the Chamber of Crafts,
Chamber of Industry and Commerce, Office for the Recognition of Foreign University Degrees, Chambers of Physicians,
Dentists, Veterinarians and Pharmacists, and Other Institutions. The dependent variable is the share of days in employ-
ment per month in column (1), log real wages for full-time employees in column (2), the index of occupational regulation,
assigning a value of zero to the non-employed in column (3), and the index of occupational regulation in column (4). Ad-
ditional controls are individual fixed effects, time fixed effects, time since migration fixed effects, age squared, and German
language proficiency.
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the individual level: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
an increase of the regulation index by 28.4 percentage points, conditional on employment.
This reflects the fact that physicians, dentists, veterinarians, and pharmacists are all
licensed occupations and hence a formal recognition indispensable for working in these
occupations.
Immigrants who obtain recognition from the Office for the Recognition of Foreign Uni-
versity Degrees also experience substantial wage gains of 54.3 percent (43.4 log points)
but the employment responses are relatively small, reflecting the fact that most of the
relevant occupations are unregulated and thus already accessible prior to obtaining recog-
nition. The same is true for the Chamber of Crafts and the Chamber of Industry and
Commerce, where the effect on the probability of working in a regulated occupations,
conditional on employment, is once again not as important. Interestingly, for these two
cases there are, however, still sizeable employment and wage effects: the wage effect for
recognitions from the Chamber of Crafts is 38.6 percent (32.7 log points) and the em-
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Table 6: Static Effects by GDP in Country of Origin
Log Wage Regulation Regulation Index
Employment (Full-time) Index (Employed)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Application period 0.031 -0.053 0.007 0.068
(0.068) (0.100) (0.035) (0.072)
Received full recognition 0.177*** 0.143 0.149*** 0.138*
(0.052) (0.100) (0.035) (0.077)
Received full recognition -0.000 -0.016** 0.001 0.000
× GDP/capita 2015 (demeaned) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.003)
Mean GDP/capita 5.49 5.80 5.56 5.76
Individuals 1,140 780 1,140 1,014
with recognition 133 107 133 125
without recognition 1,007 673 1,007 889
Observations 124,982 46,925 118,439 68,362
Note. Data source: IAB-SOEP Migration Sample linked to IEB data. Estimates based on specification (1) includ-
ing a dummy for the application period and an interaction term with demeaned GDP per capita. The dependent
variable is the share of days in employment per month in column (1), log real wages for full-time employees in col-
umn (2), the index of occupational regulation, assigning a value of zero to the non-employed in column (3), and the
index of occupational regulation in column (4). Additional controls are individual fixed effects, time fixed effects,
time since migration fixed effects, age squared, and German language proficiency. The mean GDP/capita is the av-
erage among included individuals weighted by their number of observations (in $1,000). GDP information is taken
from World Bank database.
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the individual level: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
ployment effect for recognitions from the Chamber of Industry and Commerce is 25.8
percentage points.26 Together with the positive wage effects estimated for recognitions
from the Office for the Recognition of Foreign University Degrees, these results suggest
that even for unregulated occupations a formal recognition in Germany has significant
positive effects on subsequent labor market outcomes, possibly due to its role in signalling
immigrants’ skills to potential employers.
An important finding in the literature on immigrant assimilation is that the transfer-
ability of immigrants’ skills depends on the closeness between the education system of the
origin country and the host country. A natural question in this context is whether the
effect of occupational recognition also varies with the characteristics of the immigrants’
home countries. Using GDP per capita as a proxy for the closeness between the home
country and Germany, the estimates in Table 6 show that the effect of recognition is
quite homogeneous across home countries. By demeaning the interaction variable, the
coefficient on the main recognition dummy is close to the average effect we estimate in
our baseline specification. The coefficients of the interaction terms, in turn, are very
close to zero, with the only exception being the impact on wages, where an increase
26Different labor market institutions, such as unionization and other occupation-specific regulations,
might explain why recognitions from the Chamber of Crafts primarily affect wages while recognitions
from the Chamber of Industry and Commerce mostly affect the employment margin.
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of GDP per capita by $1,000 leads to a 1.6 percent smaller increase in wages. This is
not surprising since immigrants from richer countries are likely to earn higher wages in
the German labor market to start with due to the better quality and transferability of
their home country specific human capital, so that they have less to gain from obtaining
occupational recognition than immigrants from poorer countries.
6 Implications for Immigrant Earnings Assimilation
Our results so far have shown significant positive long-run effects of occupational recogni-
tion on immigrants’ employment and wage outcomes. In this section, we put these gains
into perspective by relating them to standard earnings assimilation profiles of immigrants
in Germany. For this purpose, we merge a 1 percent random sample of native German
workers in the IEB to our IAB-SOEP Migration Sample and jointly estimate the following
immigrant and native earnings equations:
Immigrants: logwit = φ
′
mXit+αm · ageit+ β · ysmit+ γ · ysrit+ δCi+ θmπt+ εit
Natives: logwit = φ
′
nXit+αn · ageit+ θnπt+ εit,
(3)
where wit are total monthly earnings of individual i at time t, Xit is a vector of socioeco-
nomic characteristics (educational attainment27, gender, federal state of residence), ageit
represents a quartic function of the individual’s age, ysmit represents a quartic function
of the number of years since migration, ysrit represents a quartic function of the number
of years passed since the result of the recognition process was obtained (set to zero for
all immigrants who never applied for recognition), Ci is a vector of dummy variables
indicating an immigrant’s arrival cohort (1970-1994, 1995-2005, 2005-2013), and πt is a
vector of year fixed effects. Since aging, cohort and period effects are perfectly collinear,
we impose the standard assumption that period effects are the same for immigrants and
natives (θm = θn) as suggested by Borjas (1995). We estimate this model using all avail-
able monthly native and immigrant observations, clustering our standard errors at the
individual level. The immigrants in the sample belong to four distinct groups: immigrants
who never applied for recognition, immigrants who applied but were denied recognition,
immigrants who applied and gained partial recognition, and immigrants who applied and
gained full recognition. We drop immigrants who applied for recognition but whose de-
cision is pending at the time of the survey from the sample. In the estimation, we allow
the age, years since migration and years since recognition profiles to vary between each
of the four immigrant groups.
Rather than presenting the full regression results, which can be found in Table A.5
in the appendix, we use the estimates from the two-equation regression model in (3) to
27We use the imputed education variable obtained by applying the IP1 algorithm developed by Fitzen-
berger et al. (2005).
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Figure 2: Effect of Recognition on Immigrant Assimilation Profiles
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Note: The displayed simulations of earnings profiles in the left and right panel are based on parameter estimates reported
in columns (2) and (4) of Table A.5, respectively. Immigrants are assumed to enter Germany at the age of 25, with the
comparison being relative to natives of the same age. We compute each profile for the mean values of all socioeconomic
characteristics in the sample, thus accounting for observable differences in educational attainment, gender, federal state of
residence and time period between the different immigrant groups and natives. The intercepts of the different immigrant
groups reflect their weighted mean cohort effects. The left panel shows the predicted earnings profiles without controlling
for occupations, the right panel the profiles after controlling for 3-digit occupations in the IEB data.
predict native and immigrant earnings profiles (compare column (2) of Table A.5). We
simulate earnings profiles for immigrants who enter Germany at the age of 25 and compare
them to the corresponding earnings profile of natives of the same age. We compute
each profile for the mean values of all socioeconomic characteristics in the sample, thus
netting out the effects arising from observable differences in educational attainment,
gender, federal state of residence and time period between the different immigrant groups
and natives. The intercepts of the four immigrant groups reflect the weighted means of
their cohort effects.28 For clarity, the left panel of Figure 2 only depicts the predicted
log earnings profiles of native Germans, immigrant non-applicants, and immigrants who
eventually receive full recognition, suppressing the corresponding profiles for immigrants
whose application is denied and immigrants who only receive partial recognition, which
together make up only a small fraction of the overall sample.
Immigrants who never apply for recognition (who make up 81.5 percent of the immi-
grant sample) initially face an earnings gap relative to native Germans of 40.5 percent
(51.9 log points) which steadily declines over time, levelling off at around 22.5 percent
(25.5 log points) after 15 years of residence in Germany. The earnings of immigrants who
eventually obtain full recognition (11.6 percent of the immigrant sample) grow initially
at a similar rate but start from a more advantageous position, with an earnings gap upon
arrival of only 31.0 percent (37.1 log points). After obtaining full recognition, which
for these simulations we assume to occur after three years of residence in Germany (the
mean duration between arrival and recognition in the assimilation sample), the speed of
28Similarly to Bratsberg et al. (2006), we allow the returns to education and gender to vary between
natives and immigrants, but not between different immigrant groups. We further assume that the region
effects are the same for immigrants and natives.
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convergence of these immigrants’ earnings increases substantially (dashed line), leading
to a catch-up and eventual overtaking of native earnings after about 8 years, with a max-
imum positive earnings advantage of around 19.8 percent (18.0 log points) observed after
17 years in the country. However, due to the small sample size, we lack precision in the
estimates for the immigrant group with full recognition, so that from 5 years since migra-
tion onwards, their earnings gap relative to natives is no longer statistically significant.
These findings suggest that occupational recognition has a significant effect on the speed
of immigrants’ economic assimilation in Germany.
Part of the reason for why immigrants who obtain full recognition may outperform
the average native in the left panel of Figure 2 is their greater likelihood of working
in high-paying occupations, for example in the health sector. Controlling for educa-
tional attainment partly accounts for such heterogeneity but even within the group of
say university-educated workers, immigrants with occupational recognition are likely to
be working in more attractive occupations. In the right panel of Figure 2, we depict
predicted assimilation profiles from an extended specification in which we control for a
full set of 3-digit occupation dummies (compare column (4) of Table A.5). Since part of
the growth in immigrants’ earnings over time is due to their climbing of the occupational
ladder, one would generally not want to control for occupation in these types of assimila-
tion regressions. Including occupation fixed effects, however, improves the comparability
of natives and immigrants in our sample and, importantly, reveals information about the
relative earnings of immigrants and natives within the same occupations, which could be
interpreted as a proxy for the quality of the services provided by immigrants relative to
natives in the same types of jobs.
As the right panel of Figure 2 shows, holding the occupational distribution constant
across groups, reduces somewhat the earnings gaps of the different immigrants groups
relative to natives. The initial gaps for non-applicants and immigrants who eventually
obtain full recognition are now almost identical, 28.7 percent (33.8 log points) and 25.4
percent (29.4 log points) respectively. As before, we do observe an acceleration of the
speed of assimilation at the time recognition is obtained and an eventual overtaking
of native earnings after 10 years, with the maximum gap amounting to a statistically
not significant 14.9 percent (13.9 log points) 17 years after arrival. The good relative
performance of immigrants who obtain full recognition for their foreign qualifications is
therefore not just due to their advantageous distribution across occupations relative to the
representative sample of natives that serves as the comparison group. Rather, it appears
that even conditional on occupation, these immigrants perform at least at the same level
as their native counterparts, mitigating concerns that occupational recognition leads to a
dilution of occupational standards and suggesting that the formal recognition process in
Germany does a reasonable job in ensuring the equivalence of foreign qualifications with
their native counterparts.
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7 Conclusion
In this paper, we analyze how the formal recognition of immigrants’ foreign qualifications
affects their subsequent labor market outcomes. For our analysis, we exploit a novel
linked survey-social security data set which, besides including comprehensive informa-
tion about workers’ entire work histories, explicitly asks participants, if applicable, about
the timing of their recognition process in Germany. This allows us to assess in detail how
occupational recognition affects immigrant labor market outcomes, both from a static and
dynamic point view. Comparing the labor market outcomes of immigrants who obtain
full recognition to those of immigrants who either never apply or have not yet received
full recognition themselves, the evidence from our dynamic difference-in-differences spec-
ification suggests large and long-lasting positive effects of occupational recognition on
immigrants’ labor market outcomes, with a 24.5 percentage point higher employment
rate and a 19.8 percent higher hourly wage three years after obtaining recognition. We
further document that occupational recognition indeed induces workers to enter regu-
lated occupations, both directly out of non-employment and, with some delay, through
horizontal movements of employed workers from unregulated into regulated occupations.
Further heterogeneity analysis suggests that formal recognition is not only beneficial
with respect to regulated occupations but also when it comes to occupations that are
freely accessible even in the absence of recognition. This important finding suggests that,
besides granting access to regulated occupations, the certification of foreign qualifications
also plays a signalling role in the German labor market, eliminating uncertainty about an
immigrant worker’s occupational skills. The signalling value of formal recognition appears
to be particularly large for immigrants from less developed countries, who, at least in
terms of wages, benefit significantly more from the recognition of their qualifications.
This could be due to the higher initial degree of uncertainty in the German labor market
regarding these immigrants’ qualifications, which means there is more to gain from a
formal certification of these qualifications’ equivalence with their native counterparts.
We conclude by showing that occupational recognition leads to a significant accelera-
tion of immigrants’ earnings growth relative to natives. Recognizing immigrants’ foreign
credentials may thus be an effective way of tapping into their human capital and foster-
ing their integration into the host country’s economy. More generally, our results suggest
that part of the substantial employment and wage gaps between natives and immigrants
around the world may be due to the lack of formal recognition of the latter’s occupational
qualifications. The large positive wage effects and the eventual full convergence to native
earnings indicate that, at least in Germany, foreign credentials, once declared equivalent
to native ones, are indeed valued in the labor market, mitigating fears of a watering-down
of occupational standards.
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Appendix
A.1 Tables and Figures
Table A.1: Distribution of Occupations for Requested
Recognition
Occupation %
Doctor 13.16
Engineer 13.16
Nurse 10.53
Veterinary 10.53
Teacher 7.89
Civil Servant (executive officer) 2.63
Pharmacist 2.63
Midwife 2.63
Shop Assistant 2.63
Physioterapist 2.63
Correspondent in foreign language 2.63
Agrotechnical Assistant (state approved) 2.63
IT-Assistant (state approved) 2.63
Vocational College in Electronics (state approved) 2.63
Business Economist 2.63
Biologic Laboratory Technician (state approved) 2.63
Marketing Specialist 2.63
Cook 2.63
Food Inspector 2.63
Financial advisor 2.63
Manufacturer 2.63
Reseacher 2.63
Total 100.00
Note. Data source: IAB-SOEP Migration Sample, third wave. The table refers to
the distribution of occupations for which recognition was requested. Only individuals
obtaining full recognition are considered.
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Table A.2: Impact of Different Sample Selection Procedures
Migration (1) + w/o (2) + working (3) + stay
after 18yr incapacity age in Germany
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Employment
Application period -0.008 0.023 0.051 0.024
(0.058) (0.055) (0.060) (0.067)
Received full recognition 0.149*** 0.172*** 0.162*** 0.165***
(0.055) (0.049) (0.055) (0.052)
Individuals 1,470 1,412 1,346 1,218
with recognition 166 159 158 140
without recognition 1,304 1,253 1,188 1,078
Observations 189,027 176,994 155,566 136,306
Log Real Wage
Application period -0.139 -0.117 -0.113 -0.053
(0.097) (0.098) (0.102) (0.105)
Received full recognition 0.070 0.089 0.086 0.141
(0.096) (0.103) (0.106) (0.103)
Individuals 1,019 976 924 830
with recognition 135 129 128 114
without recognition 884 847 796 716
Observations 62,982 59,280 55,765 50,971
Regulation Index
Application period 0.020 0.025 0.028 0.009
(0.029) (0.030) (0.033) (0.035)
Received full recognition 0.144*** 0.153*** 0.157*** 0.152***
(0.032) (0.033) (0.037) (0.035)
Individuals 1,470 1,412 1,346 1,218
with recognition 166 159 158 140
without recognition 1,304 1,253 1,188 1,078
Observations 181,088 169,313 148,378 129,471
Regulation Index (Employed)
Application period 0.041 0.045 0.040 0.065
(0.051) (0.053) (0.057) (0.065)
Received full recognition 0.118** 0.123** 0.123** 0.129*
(0.054) (0.056) (0.059) (0.068)
Individuals 1,316 1,268 1,198 1,081
with recognition 159 152 150 132
without recognition 1,157 1,116 1,048 949
Observations 92,140 87,004 80,782 74,003
Note. Data source: IAB-SOEP Migration Sample linked to IEB data. All estimations
based on specification (1) including a dummy for the application period. The dependent
variable is the share of days in employment per month in Panel A, log real hourly wages
for full-time employees averaged over all spells in a given month in Panel B, the index of
occupational regulation, assigning a value of zero to the non-employed, in Panel C, and
the index of occupational regulation in Panel D. Additional controls are individual fixed
effects, time fixed effects, time since migration fixed effects, age squared, and German lan-
guage proficiency. The sample comprises immigrants who either receive full recognition or
never apply. Additional selection rules are described in the heading.
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the individual level. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05,
*** p<0.01.
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Table A.3: Impact of Control Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Employment
Application period -0.237*** -0.108* 0.032 0.027 0.024
(0.066) (0.065) (0.066) (0.066) (0.067)
Received full recognition 0.153*** 0.127*** 0.170*** 0.166*** 0.165***
(0.034) (0.035) (0.051) (0.051) (0.052)
Individuals 1,218 1,218 1,218 1,218 1,218
with recognition 140 140 140 140 140
without recognition 1,078 1,078 1,078 1,078 1,078
Observations 136,306 136,306 136,306 136,306 136,306
Log Real Wages (Full-time)
Application period -0.061 -0.026 -0.034 -0.047 -0.053
(0.167) (0.161) (0.101) (0.105) (0.105)
Received full recognition 0.242*** 0.242*** 0.136 0.148 0.141
(0.056) (0.055) (0.101) (0.104) (0.103)
Individuals 830 830 830 830 830
with recognition 114 114 114 114 114
without recognition 716 716 716 716 716
Observations 50,971 50,971 50,971 50,971 50,971
Regulation Index
Application period 0.019 0.023 0.013 0.011 0.009
(0.018) (0.019) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035)
Received full recognition 0.117*** 0.117*** 0.155*** 0.153*** 0.152***
(0.022) (0.021) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035)
Individuals 1,218 1,218 1,218 1,218 1,218
with recognition 140 140 140 140 140
without recognition 1,078 1,078 1,078 1,078 1,078
Observations 129,471 129,471 129,471 129,471 129,471
Regulation Index (Employed)
Application Period 0.096* 0.082 0.068 0.066 0.065
(0.054) (0.053) (0.066) (0.066) (0.065)
Received full recognition 0.149*** 0.150*** 0.131* 0.130* 0.129*
(0.030) (0.029) (0.068) (0.068) (0.068)
Individuals 1,081 1,081 1,081 1,081 1,081
with recognition 132 132 132 132 132
without recognition 949 949 949 949 949
Observations 74,003 74,003 74,003 74,003 74,003
Time since migration fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed effects Yes Yes
Controls Yes
Note. Data source: IAB-SOEP Migration Sample linked to IEB data. All estimations based on
specification (1) including a dummy for the application period. The dependent variable is the
share of days in employment per month in Panel A, log real hourly wages for full-time employees
averaged over all spells in a given month in Panel B, the index of occupational regulation, assign-
ing a value of zero to the non-employed, in Panel C, and the index of occupational regulation in
Panel D. Sample selection is according to the results in Table 3. Additional controls are specified
for each column in the table. The category Controls includes age squared and German language
proficiency.
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the individual level. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05,
*** p<0.01.
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Table A.4: Static Effects of Occupational Recognition - Excluding Non-Applicants
Log Wage Regulation Regulation Index
Employment (Full-time) Index (Employed)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A
Received full recognition 0.186*** 0.154* 0.137*** 0.105
(0.062) (0.081) (0.037) (0.064)
Panel B
Application period 0.020 0.031 -0.007 0.048
(0.067) (0.097) (0.040) (0.071)
Received full recognition 0.191*** 0.163 0.136*** 0.116
(0.065) (0.105) (0.041) (0.077)
Individuals 140 114 140 132
Observations 17,170 8,563 16,405 10,581
Note. Data source: IAB-SOEP Migration Sample linked to IEB data. Panel A reports the estimates based
on specification (1), Panel B adds a dummy variable for the application period as discussed in the text.
The dependent variable is the share of days in employment per month in column (1), log real hourly wages
for full-time employees averaged over all spells in a given month in column (2), the index of occupational
regulation, assigning a value of zero to the non-employed, in column (3), and the index of occupational
regulation in column (4). Additional controls are individual fixed effects, time fixed effects, time since
migration fixed effects, age squared, and German language proficiency. The sample comprises only immi-
grants who eventually receive full recognition, and who migrated to Germany at the age of at least 18,
stayed in Germany after arrival and do not have any reported incapacity for work. Observations are only
included when migrant’s age is at least 25 and less than 60.
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the individual level: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table A.5: Assimilation Regressions
No Occupation Controls With Occupation Controls
(1) (2) (3 (4)
Never 1.184 (6.285) 1.138 (6.285) -1.366 (5.923) -1.379 (5.925)
Denied 24.739 (30.449) 33.459 (35.290) 39.808 (31.468) 56.424 (34.324)
Partial 7.880 (29.353) 17.998 (28.714) 36.511 (25.968) 42.049 (26.109)
Full -18.379 (14.747) -12.493 (14.999) -12.638 (12.603) -9.005 (12.717)
Never × YSM 0.004 (0.028) 0.002 (0.028) 0.004 (0.025) 0.004 (0.025)
Denied × YSM -0.045 (0.197) 0.071 (0.198) -0.074 (0.239) 0.152 (0.248)
Partial × YSM 0.235 (0.151) 0.190 (0.172) 0.341* (0.172) 0.328 (0.175)
Full × YSM -0.003 (0.058) -0.031 (0.058) -0.037 (0.051) -0.061 (0.051)
Never × YSM2/10 0.014 (0.040) 0.017 (0.040) 0.007 (0.036) 0.007 (0.036)
Denied × YSM2/10 0.230 (0.353) 0.011 (0.365) 0.268 (0.424) -0.090 (0.439)
Partial × YSM2/10 -0.330 (0.245) -0.278 (0.254) -0.473 (0.256) -0.436 (0.252)
Full × YSM2/10 0.044 (0.075) -0.073 (0.074) 0.071 (0.068) -0.029 (0.070)
Never × YSM3/100 -0.005 (0.021) -0.007 (0.021) -0.003 (0.019) -0.003 (0.019)
Denied × YSM3/100 -0.203 (0.235) -0.066 (0.243) -0.230 (0.277) -0.015 (0.285)
Partial × YSM3/100 0.208 (0.161) 0.168 (0.147) 0.268 (0.156) 0.228 (0.149)
Full × YSM3/100 -0.022 (0.035) 0.088* (0.041) -0.034 (0.033) 0.052 (0.038)
Never × YSM4/1000 0.000 (0.003) 0.001 (0.003) 0.000 (0.003) 0.000 (0.003)
Denied × YSM4/1000 0.050 (0.050) 0.023 (0.052) 0.057 (0.058) 0.015 (0.060)
Partial × YSM4/1000 -0.043 (0.035) -0.036 (0.030) -0.051 (0.032) -0.041 (0.031)
Full × YSM4/1000 0.003 (0.005) -0.018* (0.007) 0.005 (0.005) -0.011 (0.006)
Age 0.412*** (0.011) 0.412*** (0.011) 0.388*** (0.011) 0.388*** (0.011)
Age2/10 -0.144*** (0.004) -0.144*** (0.004) -0.137*** (0.004) -0.137*** (0.004)
Age3/1000 0.226*** (0.007) 0.226*** (0.007) 0.216*** (0.006) 0.216*** (0.006)
Age4/100000 -0.134*** (0.004) -0.134*** (0.004) -0.128*** (0.004) -0.128*** (0.004)
Never × Age -0.244 (0.647) -0.240 (0.647) 0.081 (0.605) 0.081 (0.605)
Denied × Age -2.318 (3.165) -3.249 (3.647) -3.940 (3.239) -5.704 (3.545)
Partial × Age -1.130 (2.956) -2.189 (2.869) -4.078 (2.621) -4.668 (2.632)
Full × Age 1.722 (1.510) 1.082 (1.533) 1.120 (1.288) 0.719 (1.297)
Never × Age2/10 0.120 (0.243) 0.119 (0.243) -0.026 (0.226) -0.026 (0.226)
Denied × Age2/10 0.739 (1.205) 1.093 (1.371) 1.384 (1.224) 2.044 (1.337)
Partial × Age2/10 0.514 (1.090) 0.924 (1.049) 1.615 (0.966) 1.846 (0.970)
Full × Age2/10 -0.583 (0.565) -0.329 (0.573) -0.358 (0.482) -0.198 (0.485)
Never × Age3/1000 -0.243 (0.399) -0.241 (0.399) 0.038 (0.367) 0.038 (0.367)
Denied × Age3/1000 -0.968 (1.992) -1.547 (2.235) -2.081 (2.015) -3.142 (2.190)
Partial × Age3/1000 -0.975 (1.749) -1.666 (1.660) -2.768 (1.549) -3.162* (1.550)
Full × Age3/1000 0.839 (0.919) 0.403 (0.930) 0.483 (0.785) 0.205 (0.788)
Never × Age4/100000 0.171 (0.240) 0.170 (0.240) -0.022 (0.219) -0.022 (0.219)
Denied × Age4/100000 0.428 (1.208) 0.773 (1.335) 1.131 (1.219) 1.754 (1.315)
Partial× Age4/100000 0.647 (1.032) 1.077 (0.963) 1.727 (0.912) 1.974* (0.908)
Full × Age4/100000 -0.438 (0.548) -0.166 (0.554) -0.233 (0.470) -0.060 (0.472)
Medium Edu 0.262*** (0.002) 0.262*** (0.002) 0.119*** (0.002) 0.119*** (0.002)
High Edu 0.673*** (0.003) 0.673*** (0.003) 0.347*** (0.003) 0.347*** (0.003)
Immigrant × Medium Edu -0.055 (0.054) -0.053 (0.053) 0.035 (0.048) 0.036 (0.048)
Immigrant × High Edu 0.190** (0.072) 0.184* (0.073) 0.218*** (0.060) 0.216*** (0.060)
Female -0.515*** (0.002) -0.515*** (0.002) -0.441*** (0.002) -0.441*** (0.002)
Immigrant × Female -0.111* (0.048) -0.100* (0.049) -0.014 (0.041) -0.007 (0.041)
Cohort 1970-1994 0.123 (0.087) 0.145 (0.087) 0.103 (0.075) 0.105 (0.075)
Cohort 1995-2004 0.050 (0.057) 0.054 (0.057) 0.059 (0.053) 0.061 (0.053)
Denied × YSR -0.017 (0.044) -0.050 (0.048)
Partial × YSR 0.027 (0.026) -0.001 (0.023)
Full × YSR 0.117*** (0.026) 0.097*** (0.023)
Denied × YSR2/10 0.023 (0.026) 0.031 (0.023)
Partial × YSR2/10 -0.018 (0.048) 0.009 (0.045)
Full × YSR2/10 -0.010 (0.012) 0.002 (0.009)
Denied × YSR3/100 0.018 (0.031) 0.018 (0.029)
Partial × YSR3/100 0.005 (0.013) 0.008 (0.010)
Full × YSR3/100 -0.057*** (0.014) -0.046*** (0.012)
Denied × YSR4/1000 -0.012 (0.012) -0.012 (0.011)
Partial × YSR4/1000 0.008 (0.014) -0.002 (0.012)
Full × YSR4/1000 0.014*** (0.004) 0.011*** (0.003)
Constant 2.227*** (0.110) 2.227*** (0.110) 1.859*** (0.192) 1.859*** (0.192)
R-squared 0.27 0.27 0.39 0.39
Observations 88,283,926 88,283,926 86,444,335 86,444,335
Note: The dependent variable are log monthly earnings, conditional on working at least one day in a given month. The omitted
categories are males, low educational attainment, immigrant cohort 2005-2014, period 1975. Standard errors are clustered at the
individual level. The sample comprises monthly observations of 571,581 individuals in columns (1) and (2) and 569,104 individuals
in columns (3) and (4).
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Figure A.1: Dynamic Effects of Occupational Recognition - Excluding Non-Applicants
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Note. Data source: IAB-SOEP Migration Sample linked to IEB data. The figures report the coefficients of the period
dummies obtained from estimating regressions of specification (2) including a dummy for the application period. The
dependent variable is the share of days in employment per month (upper left panel), log real wages for full-time employees
(upper right panel), the index of occupational regulation, assigning a value of zero to the non-employed (lower left panel) and
the index of occupational regulation (lower right panel). Additional controls are: the long-run average effect after recognition
(CertRecogi,t−61), the long-run average effect before recognition (CertRecogi,t+25) an indicator for the application period,
individual fixed effects, time fixed effects, time since migration fixed effects, age squared, and German language proficiency.
The sample only comprises immigrants who eventually receive full recognition, and who migrated to Germany at the age
of at least 18, stayed in Germany after arrival and do not have any reported incapacity for work. Observations are only
included when migrant’s age is at least 25 and less than 60. 90% and 95% confidence intervals displayed using clustered
standard errors at the individual level. Values of the confidence interval in the wage graph are cut at -0.5 for presentation
purposes.
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A.2 Synthetic Control Method
Figure A.2: Dynamic Employment Effects of Occupational Recognition
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Note: Data source: IAB-SOEP Migration Sample linked to IEB data. The displayed estimates along the thick
black lines are the average differentials in employment in each pre- and post-treatment period between all
treated units and their synthetic control groups. The thin gray lines depict 100 placebo estimations, in which
we iteratively apply the synthetic control method to randomly picked non-treated immigrants in each treated
immigrant’s donor pool.
As a robustness check for our dynamic estimation, we apply a pooled version of the
synthetic control method proposed by Abadie et al. (2010). In contrast to our main ap-
proach, each immigrant who receives recognition (the treatment) is here matched to a set
of other immigrants who never applied for recognition but whose labor market outcomes
in the period prior to application are similar to those of the treated immigrant. We ob-
tain a synthetic control group for each treated immigrant and then average the dynamic
treatment effects in each pre- and post-treatment month across all treated individuals in
the sample in those months. Note that we match directly on the corresponding outcome
variables in the year prior to application, excluding the last three months to test for
anticipation effects.
The thick black lines in Figures A.2 and A.3 show the resulting dynamic impacts of
occupational recognition on employment and hourly wages between 12 months before the
application period and 60 months after recognition. We look at hourly wages rather than
log hourly wages since otherwise it would be difficult to find potential control individuals
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Figure A.3: Dynamic Wage Effects of Occupational Recognition
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Note: Data source: IAB-SOEP Migration Sample linked to IEB data. The displayed estimates along the thick black lines
are the average differentials in hourly wages in each pre- and post-treatment period between all treated units and their
synthetic control groups, including zeros for non-employed individuals. The thin gray lines depict 100 placebo estimations,
in which we iteratively apply the synthetic control method to randomly picked non-treated immigrants in each treated
immigrant’s donor pool.
with positive wages in precisely the same months as the treated individuals. This implies
that part of the estimated impacts on hourly wages are driven by individuals finding em-
ployment and starting to earn non-zero wages. Overall, the dynamic patterns are similar
to those obtained from our regression-based approach, with substantial and relatively
quick increases in both employment and hourly wages in the months immediately after
recognition, continuing divergence at a slower pace for a couple of years, and a flattening
out of the two profiles thereafter.
To assess the statistical significance of the dynamic effects from the synthetic con-
trol group method, we perform 100 placebo estimations in which, for each iteration, we
randomly pick for each treated immigrant an untreated immigrant from his or her donor
pool, assign the same hypothetical application and recognition dates as for the treated
immigrant, find a suitable synthetic control group for this placebo immigrant, and then
aggregate all dynamic impact estimates across all placebo immigrants. As illustrated by
the thin gray lines in Figures A.2 and A.3, the estimated effects of actual occupational
recognition are large relative to the distribution of dynamic placebo effects, suggesting
that they pick up real employment and wage effects. Contrary to the regression-based
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Figure A.4: Dynamic Effects of Occupational Recognition on the Degree of Regulation
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Note: Data source: IAB-SOEP Migration Sample linked to IEB data. The displayed estimates along the thick black
lines are the average differentials in the regulation index in each pre- and post-treatment period between all treated units
and their synthetic control groups, including zeros for non-employed individuals. The thin gray lines depict 100 placebo
estimations, in which we iteratively apply the synthetic control method to randomly picked non-treated immigrants in each
treated immigrant’s donor pool.
results reported in Table 3, we find some indication for a significant positive effect of
applying itself on the probability of being employed although this effect only extends to
the first month after submitting the application.
To facilitate the assessment of the statistical significance of the estimated treatment
effects in each period, we depict their rank among the distribution of placebo effects
(gray dots) and the underlying number of treated individuals (black line) for each period
in a separate plot underneath the main graphs. Note that the sample size of treated
individuals used in these estimations is substantially smaller than in our main approach
since we need to condition on observing individuals for at least one period prior to their
application and for at least one period between their application and their recognition
date. Individuals who apply in the month they are first observed in the IEB data or
individuals who obtain the result of their application in the same month in which they
apply are thus excluded from the estimation sample.
Figure A.4 displays the corresponding dynamic effects for the average occupational
regulation index, where the index is set to zero for non-employed individuals as in our
main approach without conditioning on employment. The latter is not feasible under the
43
synthetic control approach as it would require finding suitable control individuals with
exactly the same monthly employment histories as the treated individuals. Similar to
the pattern documented in the bottom left panel of Figure 1, there is a swift increase in
the regulation index after obtaining full recognition which continues more or less uninter-
ruptedly throughout the entire post-recognition period, amounting to a value of almost
0.25 after five years.
Overall, while not entirely comparable in terms of the outcome variables considered,
we view the evidence from the synthetic control method as supportive of the main find-
ings from our regression-based difference-in-differences approach, indicating significant
and quantitatively large effects of occupational recognition on immigrants’ labor market
outcomes.
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